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Abstract
In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an ex-
change do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily aﬀord them.
At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who
benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone
participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ
intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for
a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hith-
erto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where
a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her
type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence
of non-monotone equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In many decentralised markets for heterogeneous goods or services, exchange
is aided by intermediaries. Even if trade is possible and legal without them,
intermediaries exist because they increase the realised gains from trade by
lowering the traders’ search costs and by reducing the extent of mismatch.
Nevertheless, not all traders use intermediaries. Traders who stand little to
gain from exchange may simply find intermediation too expensive, but one
often sees the traders on the two sides of the market who have the highest
surplus between them decide to trade in the direct searchmarket — risking severe
mismatch and/or incurring high search expenditure — despite the availability
of “cheap” intermediation. For example, as the title hints, the most desirable
singles neither advertise in “lonely hearts” newspaper columns nor join on-line
dating services; also, in many instances, the best jobs are not filled through
agencies, the best shops are not in shopping centres, the most exclusive holidays
are not on oﬀer in travel agencies and the best properties do not come on the
open market.1 As further examples, some banks do not allow mortgage brokers
to oﬀer their products, and some insurers advertise the fact that they are
not available on web comparison sites. In all of these markets, it is also the
case that the “worst” traders do not use intermediaries either. Formally, the
common feature of the above examples is that the traders’ decisions to enter
the intermediated (sub)market are non-monotone in type.2 The surprising
1But note that very diﬀerent outcomes can occur in similar markets: for example, on
2 December 2009, the most expensive family residence in London available for sale online
had an asking price of $66 million. The most expensive one in Rome, a market with not
too dissimilar supply and demand, was on oﬀer at $8.7 million, a figure certainly well below
the prices paid for residences at upper end of the Roman market. This dichotomy is neatly
captured by the multiplicity of equilibria in our model.
2Solid empirical evidence linking types and propensity to use intermediaries is hard to
come by. The recent paper by Hitsch et al (2010), briefly discussed in Section 5, hints at some
non-monotonicity. In general, however, survey studies of the intermediated marriage market
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fact is not so much that the high types may coordinate on such an ineﬃcient
equilibrium — after all, examples of coordination failures abound — rather that
this undesirable outcome is supported by an equilibrium at all. In this article
we investigate the features of a model that delivers such non-monotone entry
decisions and reveals the intuition underlying these equilibria.
Given the prevalence of markets where traders have the choice between in-
termediated or direct trade, it is surprising that only a few of the numerous
theoretical articles on intermediated markets allow direct and intermediated
trade to coexist. Gehrig (1993) is the seminal paper in this area: he posits
a one-shot random matching market, where the maximisation of overall gains
from trade requires matching high valuation buyers with low valuation sellers:
eﬃcient matching is negatively assortative. In his equilibrium, buyers and sell-
ers who trade are separated by a “threshold”: buyers (sellers) with valuation
below (above) the threshold trade in the direct market, buyers (sellers) with
valuation above (below) the threshold trade via the intermediary. Gehrig’s
finding that trade is via the intermediary for the matches with the highest sur-
plus is confirmed by Fingleton (1997) who models intermediaries as suppliers
of liquidity, in the sense that they buy from the sellers before securing a buyer
to sell to. Rather than a flat fee, in Yavas¸ (1994) the intermediary charges a
commission on the gains from trade. A second diﬀerence is that Yavas¸ (1994) is
a search, not a matching model. Both modelling assumptions make intermedi-
ation the less attractive the higher a type is and thus, quite naturally, he finds
a reverse threshold: traders’ participation strategies are monotone in type, but
the keener types search directly and the less keen go to the intermediary.
(e.g. Goodwin (1990), Bozon and Heran (1989), Kalmijn and Flap (2001) and Rosenfeld and
Thomas (2010)), the well established literature on users of real estate agents (Zumpano et
al 1996), and the more limited one on job exchanges (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996) contain
very limited information about users’ types. Conversely, comprehensive studies of individual
preferences in marriage markets, such as Choo and Siow (2006), do not have information
about use of intermediation.
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A crucial feature of markets with optional intermediation is that each trader’s
willingness to employ the intermediary depends on which traders decide to
join on the other side of the market. The “coordination game” nature of this
situation naturally leads to multiple equilibria. In the existing literature, as
mentioned above, all equilibria are similar in nature, characterised by a single
threshold, and hence do not tally with the empirical regularities motivating our
paper. We show here that to explain these observations, it is necessary to es-
chew the simplified modelling of negotiation between matched traders used by
the previous literature, which either studied static models (as discussed above)
or assumed a dynamic set-up, but with non-transferable utility (Bloch and Ry-
der, 2000). In contrast, our model displays a richer dynamic set-up where,
crucially, a matched trader’s share of the surplus depends on the continuation
payoﬀs, and therefore on which equilibrium the market finds itself in.
We consider a two-sided market where the traders’ types are complements:
higher types benefit more from trade with higher types than lower types do.
There are two trading periods, and in the first one each trader chooses whether
or not to pay a fixed fee to “join” the intermediary. If they join, they are
matched assortatively among those who have joined the club; if they stay out,
they are randomly matched among those who have stayed out. Once matched,
traders negotiate; crucially, refusing an exchange does not entail the loss of
all benefit from trade because all the agents who have not traded can re-enter
the market later.3 For convenience, we collapse the future into a single second
period. In this dynamic set-up, the outcome of bargaining is a function of
the continuation values of the traders, which in turn depend on their type.
We find equilibria with the following features: high quality traders trade in
the direct search market, and may suﬀer a delay in finding a suitable partner;
3Burani (2008) has a similar, fully dynamic set-up; however, for tractability, she needs to
restrict attention to two types on each side of the market, ruling out non-monotone equilibria
by construction.
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traders with medium quality use the intermediary, and so trade immediately
with probability 1; low quality traders also search directly, even when the price
of intermediation is per se insuﬃcient to deter them. The middle quality agents
who use the intermediary are therefore “sandwiched” between the high and low
quality ones who do not, and so we label this a “sandwich equilibrium”.
We show that, for a sandwich equilibrium to exist, the traders’ bargaining
share must be suﬃciently increasing in their own type.4 The logic of this
requirement can be gleaned by considering the decisions of two types: a high
type, H, who does not join the intermediary, and a medium type, M , who
does join. In order for H not to want to deviate from her equilibrium strategy
and join the intermediary instead, the probability of meeting a low type in
the open market must be suﬃciently low. Since matching is type-independent,
this is true for every trader. That is, any agent who stays out must have a
relatively high chance of meeting a high type. Given this, why does M not
want to deviate? What stops staying out and perhaps meeting a high type
from becoming an alluring prospect for M? It must be that if M meets H, he
receives a low enough share of the surplus. Given the Nash bargaining protocol,
this in turn is possible if M has a suﬃciently lower continuation value than H.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2,
and the results in Section 3. There, in Proposition 3, we show that sandwich
equilibria do indeed exist if the continuation value is increasing in type and
in Proposition 4 that they do not if the continuation value is the same for all
traders. Section 4 discusses the results and reports some numerical simula-
tions, which indicates that the set of sandwich equilibria is “large”. Section 5
concludes.
4In particular, with non-transferable utility, as assumed by Bloch and Ryder (2000),
sandwich equilibria cannot happen.
4
2 The model
2.1 The traders
We study a two-sided market where the participants meet in pairs and share
the surplus jointly available to them. For specificity we refer to the two sides
as buyers and sellers, but the set-up clearly applies to more general situations,
such as the marriage market. Each trader is characterised by an attribute: a
seller by the quality she oﬀers, denoted by q, and a buyer by the value he places
on quality, v.
There is the same (large) number of risk neutral traders on each side of the
market. We assume that the buyers’ values and the sellers’ qualities are drawn
from strictly increasing distributions FB (v) and FS (q). For convenience, we
choose the measurement of qualities and values in such a way that they are
all in [0, 1], and that FB (t) = FS (t) for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we also
refer to a generic trader’s type as t ∈ [0, 1], with values drawn from the strictly
increasing distribution F (t); its density is denoted by f (t). We will be studying
the limit situation as the number of traders tends to infinity, so that the law
of large numbers applies.
We assume complementarity between the attributes of traders: a high value
buyer appreciates an increase in quality more than a low value buyer. Note
that this means that the most eﬃcient matching is the perfectly assortative
one (see Becker, 1973). For definiteness, we assume that the joint gross surplus
available to the matched pair of a seller of quality q and a buyer of value v is
given by 2vq.
Within a matched pair of traders, utility is transferable and the outcome
of negotiation is given by the Nash bargaining solution. That is, each trader
obtains the sum of (i) the payoﬀ he/she would obtain if trade did not happen
— the status quo (or continuation) payoﬀ—, and (ii) one half of the net surplus
from trade. The latter is given by the diﬀerence between the gross surplus and
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the sum of the parties’ status quo payoﬀs. If it is negative, no trade takes place.
The nature of the status quo payoﬀ, whether it is exogenously given or
endogenously determined, has a crucial influence on the equilibrium set. In a
static set-up, there is no future and so the status quo payoﬀ is exogenously fixed
at 0. As we show below, in this case it is impossible to capture the empirical
regularities mentioned in the Introduction. We therefore posit a dynamic set-
up, and deliberately choose an extremely simple one.
There are two periods. At the beginning of the first period, traders on both
sides of the market simultaneously choose whether they wish to participate
in the direct market or to employ the intermediary. Their choices create two
submarkets: the intermediated and the direct market. Within each submarket
all the traders on the short side get matched (with equal probability) to someone
on the long side. That is, we assume that the matching technology is eﬃcient.
If the matched traders trade, they leave the market. If they do not trade,
they stay in the market, and will be matched again in the second period. Any
unmatched trader also stays in the market. There is no entry of new traders.
The continuation payoﬀ of the traders who return to the market satisfies the
following condition.
Assumption 1 The present value of trading in the second period equals a pro-
portion λ ∈ (0, 1) of the utility a trader would receive if in the second period
he/she were perfectly assortatively matched among the remaining traders.
λ is a measure of the cost of delaying trade. For example, if, in the second
period, all traders who have not traded in the first period were indeed matched
assortatively, say by a free intermediary, then λ would simply be the discount
factor. Alternatively, Assumption 1 holds if traders use hyperbolic discounting,
whereby the discounted present value of a reward W in period t > 0 is given
by λγtW , with γ ∼= 1. This means that traders believe that they will become
infinitely patient from the next period onwards, and therefore believe that
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they will be willing to wait indefinitely for the perfect match, leading to the
eﬃcient assortative matching.5 Assumption 1 ensures that, in equilibrium, a
trader’s continuation payoﬀ is a fixed proportion of the surplus from trade with
a partner of matching type. This is a convenient — but clearly not the only — way
to capture the requirement that the continuation payoﬀ of a trader increases
with his/her type. This will be seen to be crucial to establish the existence of
equilibria with the ability to capture the empirical regularities which motivate
our paper.
2.2 The intermediary
The supermodular nature of the game we study implies that the Pareto eﬃcient
outcome is perfect assortative matching. If traders are matched randomly in the
open market, the eﬃciency of the matching can be increased by an intermediary.
In our set-up, the intermediary reduces the mismatch cost, whereby, in order to
avoid future search costs, an agent may accept to trade even though she knows
that there are better partners available.
The simplest form of intermediation is one where the intermediary selects as
“members”, through price or other means, only a subset of traders from both
sides of the market (see, for example, Damiano and Li, 2007), and subsequently
matches its members randomly. This merely ensures that members meet with
members only, but already reduces mismatch. In practice, intermediaries, from
tour operators through online dating services to wholesalers of grain and tea,6
5Note that our set-up satisfies the suﬃcient conditions proposed by Shimer and Smith
(2000) for assortative matching in a dynamic search equilibrium. Damiano et al. (2005)
imply that such a dynamic matching model would unravel and lead to pooling instead of
assortative matching. However, their result depends crucially on the assumption that there
are per period fixed costs of participation. With discounting only, as in our model, assortative
matching is the limit for infinitely patient players. Lu and McAfee (1996) use simulations to
establish this in a closely related model (without intermediation).
6See for example, Clerides et al. (2008), Hitsch et al (2010) Gabre-Mahdin (2001) and
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make very good use of their understanding of their members’ characteristics to
improve the eﬃciency of matches, by arranging the traders into fine clusters
and restricting matches to within each cluster. This practice approximates
assortative matching, and, for the sake of simplicity, we take it to the extreme
and assume that the intermediary has access to a costless, perfectly assortative
matching technology. Thus the intermediary will match the highest members
from each side of the markets, the two second highest ones, and so on. The
low ranked members on the long side will remain unmatched, and try their
luck in the second period. Some related analysis shows that perfect assortative
matching is not a particularly strong assumption: McAfee (2002) and Hoppe
et al (2008) show that the loss of eﬃciency from a “coarse” relative to a “fine”
clustering is very low.
Joining7 the intermediary entails paying an exogenously given joining fee
c > 0, which is the same for all traders.8
We end this Section with a summary of the extensive from of the game.
1. At the beginning of Period 1 all traders simultaneously decide whether to
join the intermediary and pay the joining fee c > 0, or to trade in the
direct market.
2. Matching takes place in the two separate submarkets. If more traders join
the intermediary from one side, then the traders on this side whose rank-
ing is lower than the lowest ranking on the other side remain unmatched.
Koo and Lo (2004), respectively. Biglaiser (1993) gives a theoretical treatment.
7As will become apparent, our model is equivalent to a situation where the intermediary’s
fee is paid only by the traders who are matched.
8Notice how our model could be reinterpreted as a special case of two-sided markets,
where traders are restricted to trade via “platforms”. One platform is direct trade, the other
is the intermediary. The former has lower eﬃciency and an exogenously given zero fee. To
our knowledge, such a set-up has not been analysed in this literature. The most closely
related papers are Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Damiano and Li (2007,
2008) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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Within each matched pair, voluntary trade occurs, according to the Nash
bargaining solution. Buyers and sellers who trade leave the game.
3. In Period 2, all remaining traders are assortatively matched and they
trade, according to the Nash bargaining solution (with zero status quo
payoﬀs). Seen from Period 1, the payoﬀs from agreements in Period 2
are discounted by λ.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We begin by calculating the payoﬀs in the case where the joining decisions
mirror each other on the two sides of the market. Let A be the set of types
that do not join the intermediary, and let µ (A) denote the measure of buyers
(and sellers) who do not join.
Proposition 1 If the set of types that join the intermediary is the same on
both sides, then the payoﬀ of a trader of type t ∈ [0, 1] is
t2 − c, (1)
if he/she joins the intermediary, and is arbitrarily close9 to
λt2 +
R
A
max
©
tq − λ
2
(q2 + t2) , 0
ª
f (q) dq
µ (A)
, (2)
if he/she does not join.
Proof. (1) is obvious: since the intermediary matches the members assortatively,
and since the n-th ranked type that joins the intermediary is the same on both sides
of the market, type t is matched with type t and they trade immediately. By doing so,
they obtain payoﬀ t2−c, because, since they have the same outside option, they share
9To avoid repetition in the rest of the paper the qualifier “arbitrarily close” (x and y are
arbitrarily close if, for any ε > 0, there exists nε such that if the number of traders exceeds
nε, then |x− y| < ε) is kept implicit.
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the gross surplus equally, from which the joining fee is subtracted. Consider next (2),
the payoﬀ for not joining the intermediary. This is simply the weighted average payoﬀ
of all possible matches. The probability of a match with type q is approximated, for
n going to infinity, by f(q)µ(A) . The payoﬀ to type t following a match with type q is
max
©
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
, 0
ª
. To show this, note that in equilibrium, the continuation
payoﬀ of a type t trader is (arbitrarily close to) λt2. This is the case because, in
period 2, the type distribution is the same on the two sides of the market: in the
first period symmetry holds by assumption and, by the law of large numbers, the
distribution of “leavers” is also the same on both sides.10 Therefore, trade between
t and q occurs in the first period if and only if they obtain a non-negative surplus
from trading, that is if 2tq − λ
¡
q2 + t2
¢
> 0, and (2) follows.
Based on the proof of Proposition 1, Corollary 1 identifies which matches
lead to trade.
Corollary 1 If the set of types that join the intermediary is the same on both
sides, a type v trader trades with a type q trader in the first period if and only
if q ∈
h
1−
√
1−λ2
λ v,
1+
√
1−λ2
λ v
i
.
Figure 1 illustrates this: trade occurs only if the matched traders’ type
vector is in the grey area. Notice that, since λ → 1 implies 1−
√
1−λ2
λ → 1,
as λ increases, the grey area shrinks to the diagonal: if traders are infinitely
patient, they are unwilling to “trade down” and matching must be assortative.
Vice versa, if λ → 0, we have 1−
√
1−λ2
λ → 0, and the grey area tends to the
whole square [0, 1]2: if waiting becomes infinitely costly then any match leads
to trade as the gross surplus is non-negative.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the equilibria derived in the literature
stratify the types into two groups. Definition 1 captures this idea.
10Formally, let A ⊆ [0, 1] be the set of buyers and sellers in the market in period 2. Then,
for every ε > 0, there exists a number of traders n high enough such that, if qnb (v, x) is the
proportion of type v buyers who meet a type x seller, and qns (v, x) is the proportion of type
v sellers who meet a type x buyer, then max(v,x)∈A×A |qnb (v, x)− qns (v, x)| < ε.
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Figure 1: The set of matched pairs who agree to trade in period 1.
Definition 1 A t-threshold equilibrium is a SPE with the property that all
traders with type greater than or equal to t join the intermediary.
As one would expect, our model exhibits a rich multiplicity of threshold
equilibria, as the following proposition shows. Let r = 1−
√
1−λ2
λ and σ (λ) =
λ+
R 1
r
¡
q − λ
2
(q2 + 1)
¢
f(q)dq. Note that σ (λ) ∈ [0, 1], with σ (1) = 1.
Proposition 2 For every joining fee c ∈ [0, 1− σ (λ)), there exists x(c) ∈
[0, 1) such that a t-threshold equilibrium exists for every t ∈ [x(c), 1].
Proof. Fix a putative t-threshold equilibrium. By Proposition 1, types v > t expect
a payoﬀ of v2−c in equilibrium, whereas deviating implies an expected payoﬀ of λv2+R t
0 max{vq−λ2 (q2+v2),0}f(q)dq
F (t) which, by Corollary 1, equals λv
2+
R t
vr(vq−
λ
2 (q
2+v2))f(q)dq
F (t) .
Let D (t, v) be the diﬀerence between the equilibrium and deviation payoﬀs for type
v > t. We start with establishing that D(t, v) is increasing in v, so that it is suﬃcient
to check incentive compatibility for the threshold type, v = t.
∂D(t, v)
∂v
= 2v (1− λ)−
Z t
vr
(q − λv) f(q)
F (t)
dq +
r
¡
v2r − λ2 (r2v2 + v2)
¢
f(vr)
F (t)
≥ 2t (1− λ)−
Z t
vr
(t− λt) f(q)
F (t)
dq = t (1− λ)
µ
1 +
F (vr)
F (t)
¶
≥ 0.
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Here the first inequality follows from the fact that v ≥ t ≥ q and that the last term
is 0, as the lower bound of the integral is by definition the value of q for which the
integrand is 0.
Next, observe that D(1, 1) = 1 − c − σ (λ). As the integrand in σ (λ) is strictly
increasing, we obtain a strict upper bound on σ (λ) by setting q = 1 in the integrand:
σ (λ) < λ + (1− λ) (1 − F (r)) < 1. Hence, 1 − σ (λ) > 0, so for c ∈ [0, 1 − σ (λ)),
D(1, 1) > 0.
Then, by the continuity of the function D (t, t) in t, for any c ∈ [0, 1−σ (λ)) there
exists a type x(c) < 1, such that for all v > x(c), we have D(v, v) > 0.
Finally, consider types v < t. Their equilibrium payoﬀ is at least λv2, while their
deviation payoﬀ is λv2 − c, since by Summary 2 they would not find a match with
the intermediary. Hence deviation is not profitable.
When intermediation is free, a more precise characterisation is possible:
x(0) = 0.
Corollary 2 When c = 0 there is a threshold equilibrium for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Take any t > 0. We show that there exists a t-threshold equilibrium,
which establishes the result. Consider first types below t: in the second period they
are assortatively matched, and so their period 1 reservation payoﬀ is the same in
equilibrium and following a deviation. However they trade with zero probability in
period 1 if they deviate (the intermediary will not match them), and with non-zero
probability in equilibrium. Therefore following their putative equilibrium strategy,
staying out, is preferable. Consider now a type v > t. If she follows the equilibrium
strategy, she is matched by the intermediary to type v, trades, and obtains a payoﬀ
of v2. If she deviates, she is matched to type q < t, which gives her a payoﬀ of
λv2 if she does not trade and λv2 + vq − λ2
¡
v2 + q2
¢
if she trades. Since the last
expression is strictly increasing in q for q < v and equals v2 when q = v), it is no
more than v2 for q 6 v, and so type v does not gain by deviating from her putative
equilibrium strategy. This shows that no-one has an incentive to deviate and so there
is a t-threshold equilibrium.
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That is, if joining the intermediary is free, then any type t ∈ [0, 1] can be
the threshold in a t-threshold equilibrium. A further consequence is that, for
any λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a 0-threshold equilibrium if and only if c = 0. In
words, with no intermediation fee, and only with no intermediation fee, it is
an equilibrium for all traders to join, which is the eﬃcient outcome, given our
assumption that the intermediary can sort costlessly.
Threshold equilibria are identified in the existing literature, and have a
natural explanation: the top traders join a club, which, although open to all
who are willing to pay the fee, has little use for those whose valuation and
quality is below the threshold, as they will be cold-shouldered by the members.
But this natural equilibrium configuration is not the only possible one. We
show next that there are equilibria where only traders with intermediate types
join the intermediary, while “top” and “bottom” type traders search directly.
Definition 2 A
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium with 0 ≤ t < t < 1 is a SPE,
where in period 1 a trader joins the intermediary if and only if he/she has type
t ∈
£
t, t
¤
. If 0 < t, the sandwich equilibrium is non-degenerate.
The following lemma, which we need in the proof of our main result, is of
independent interest.
Lemma 1 In a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium, the deviation payoﬀ of a type t
trader is given by:
λt2 − c for t ∈ [0, t) , (3)
λtt+
R
[0,t)∪(t,1] max
©
tq − λ
2
(q2 + tt) , 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
for t ∈
£
t, t
¤
, (4)
λt2 +max
½
tt− λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
, 0
¾
− c for t ∈
¡
t, 1
¤
. (5)
Proof. If a low type (t ∈ [0, t)) deviates and joins the intermediary, she pays the
joining fee c, does not trade, and is assortatively matched in the next period. Her
payoﬀ is therefore λt2 − c.
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Consider a middle type next: t ∈
£
t, t
¤
. Her deviation payoﬀ is determined by the
Nash bargaining solution and it is a function of her continuation value, which is λtt.
To see this, note that, following a deviation, a seller of type q is either matched to a
high type (with probability
1−F(t)
1−F(t)+F (t)
) or matched to a low type (with probability
F (t)
1−F(t)+F (t)
). In both cases, all the top buyers who reach period 2 will be matched
with a seller of type equal to their own, and therefore, a deviating type q seller will
be matched to the highest type who is left in the market after all the top buyers are
assortatively matched, which is t.
Finally, consider a high type buyer, v ∈
¡
t, 1
¤
. If he decides to join the interme-
diary, he will participate in an assortative matching, where he is the highest type.
Consequently, he will be matched with the highest type seller who joins the inter-
mediary in equilibrium, q = t. This gives his deviation payoﬀ (5), and establishes
Lemma 1.
To evaluate (4) in Lemma 1 it is necessary to determine whether a type
t ∈
£
t, t
¤
, who should join the intermediary in equilibrium, would trade in the
first period, if he/she deviated instead and were matched in the direct market.
To do so, compact notation by writing
¡
tq − λ
2
(q2 + tt)
¢
f (q) as h (q, t, t), and
1−
√
1−λ2(t/t)
λ as R ((t/t))), and write (4) as:R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
³
t, λt
2
2t−λt
´
, (6)R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+
R t
R(t/t)
t
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
h
λt2
2t−λt ,
λ
2−λt
i
, (7)R t
tR(t/t)
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+
R 1
t
h (q, t, t) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
+ λtt for t ∈
³
λ
2−λt , t
i
. (8)
Figure 2 illustrates this. The coloured subset in the diagram depicts the
combinations of types (v, q) such that if a type v ∈
£
t, t
¤
deviates and is matched
to type q ∈ [0, t) ∪
¡
t, 1
¤
, then trade occurs. These points are those above and
to the right of the locus determined by the two curves q =
v−
√
v2−λ2vt
λ and
q =
v+
√
v2−λ2vt
λ . This locus intersects the line t at v =
λt
2−λ ; it also intersects the
14
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1vt
t
λ
λ−+= tvvvq
22
tt
t
λ−
λ
2
2
λ
λ−−= tvvvq
22
tλ−
λ
2
t t
t
Figure 2: Trade following a deviation by a type t ∈
£
t, t
¤
.
diagonal at v = λt
2−λ . It reaches its leftmost point (a minimum on the vertical
axis) at point (v = λ2t, q = λt), and it has a horizontal asymptote at q = λ
2
t.
Finally, it intersect the line q = 1 at v = λ
2−λt , and the line
v
λ
¡
1−
√
1− λ2
¢
at
v = t.
We are now ready to present our main result.
Proposition 3 If the density function f(t) is Lipschitz continuous at 0, then
for any λ > 1
2
, there exists c∗ > 0 such that, for every c ∈ [0, c∗], there exists a
non-degenerate
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium.
Proof. We begin by considering the special case of a degenerate sandwich equi-
librium, t = 0, no entry fee, and c = 0. Our argument will be based on the concept
of
©
t, t
ª
-almost strict sandwich equilibrium, (
©
t, t
ª
-ASSE). This is a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich
equilibrium where all traders, with the exception of trader t = 0, strictly prefer to
follow their equilibrium strategy rather than deviate; trader t = 0 is indiﬀerent. We
first show that there are
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE’s. Next we establish the existence of a
©
ε, t
ª
-
ASSE: it is possible to increase the lower bound of the set of “joiners” slightly above
0, to some ε > 0, and maintain the property that all traders, including traders in
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(0, ε], strictly prefer to follow their equilibrium strategy rather than to deviate. This
establishes the proposition for the special case c = 0. Since all traders who join the
intermediary strictly prefer to do so, it is possible to choose a positive c such that
this continues to be the case, establishing the Proposition.
To begin, therefore, we first want to show that, for some t ∈ (0, 1), when t = 0 and
c = 0, the types in
¡
0, t
¢
(the “degenerate” middle) prefer to join the intermediary
and the types above t prefer not to. Formally:
t2 >
R
(t,1] max
©
tq − λ2 q2, 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ ¡0, t¤ , (9)R
(t,1] max
©
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
, 0
ª
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > max½tt− λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
, 0
¾
for t ∈
£
t, 1
¤
.
(10)
To ensure almost strictness, we require that both (9) and (10) be satisfied at t. Take
constraint (10), and evaluate it for the marginal type, t = t. We need to show thatR
(t,1] max
n
tq − λ2
³
q2 + t
2
´
, 0
o
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > (1− λ) t2.
This is implied by R
(t,1]
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ > µ1− λ
2
¶
t
2. (11)
Note that the LHS in (11) is the average value of the function g (q) = tq − λ2 q2 in
the interval [t, 1], while the RHS is g(t). g(q) is a negative quadratic and hence it
reaches its minimum on [t, 1] either at t or at 1. Consequently, a suﬃcient condition
for the strict inequality to hold is that g(t) = t2
¡
1− λ2
¢
≤ t − λ2 = g(1). This is
equivalent to t ∈
h
λ
2−λ , 1
i
, which is non-empty for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Next, we show that
if the inequality is satisfied for the marginal type, t = t, it is also satisfied for all
types t > t . Note first that whenever tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢
> tt− λ2
³
t2 + t
2
´
for every t,
it is also true that q ∈ [t, 1], and therefore (10) is implied byR
(t,1]
¡
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + t2
¢¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ − tt+ λ
2
³
t2 + t
2
´
> 0 for t ∈
£
t, 1
¤
.
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Diﬀerentiate the LHS of the above with respect to t:R
(t,1] (q − λt) f(q)dq
1− F (t) −
¡
t− λt
¢
.
Note that the first term is the average of h(q) = q − λt in the interval [t, 1], while
the second is h(t). As h(q) is increasing in q, the above is positive and so (10) holds
for t ∈
h
λ
2−λ , 1
i
.
Next consider (9), which requires that types in
£
0, t
¤
prefer to join the intermedi-
ary rather than deviate. (9) can be written as expressions (6)-(8), which, for t = 0,
reduce to (note that limt→0R (t/t) = 2λt):
t2 > 0 for t ∈
³
0, λt2
´
,
t2 >
R t
2λ
t
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ hλt2 , λ2i,
t2 >
R 1
t
¡
tq − λ2 q2
¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢ for t ∈ ¡λ2 , t¤.
The first line is clearly true. Consider the second. Since 2λt < 1, the RHS does not
exceed the average of k(q) = tq − λ2 q2 in the set
h
t, 2tλ
i
. k(q) is a negative quadratic
with its global maximum at q = tλ , which is to the left of
2t
λ . Therefore its maximum
in
h
t, 2tλ
i
is either at q = t or at q = tλ . Hence, a suﬃcient condition for the second
line to hold with slack (given that k(q) is not constant) is t2 ≥ max
n
k(t), k
³
t
λ
´o
=
max
n
tt− λ2 t
2
, t
2
2λ
o
. When t ≤ t the LHS of the quadratic inequality t2−tt+ λ2 t
2 ≥ 0
has no real roots for λ ≥ 12 . Therefore for λ ≥
1
2 the condition in the second line is
always satisfied.
Finally, the third line. We have the same situation as with the second line, except
that now the maximum of k(q) might be reached at q = 1, as tλ may be greater than
one. Hence, we have the additional condition: t2 ≥ t− λ2 , which again is guaranteed
for λ ≥ 12 .
We have thus shown that when λ ≥ 12 and c = 0, there exists a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE for
any t ≥ λ2−λ ≥
1
3 . The next Lemma ensures that this continues to be the case if
the lower bound of the middle group, those who join the intermediary, is increased
slightly.
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Lemma 2 Let c = 0, and let t be such that there exists a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE. Then there
exists ε > 0 such that there exists an
©
ε, t
ª
-ASSE.
Proof. Take a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE and a t > 0. All types t ∈ (0, t) will still strictly prefer
not to deviate, as by symmetry and Summary 2, they will not be matched if they
join the intermediary. Types in
¡
t, 1
¤
, will become more inclined to deviate as they
now might be matched with a trader from the bottom slice. However, as we have
started from a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE, by the continuity of payoﬀs in t (due to the Lipschitz
continuity of f), we can take a small enough t > 0 that keeps the top types from
deviating. Thus, to establish the lemma we only need to show that for some (small)
t > 0, types t ∈
£
t, t
¤
strictly prefer not to deviate. Since we had a
©
0, t
ª
-ASSE, (7)
and (8) are still satisfied for t > 0 suﬃciently small, so we only need to check that
(6) holds. Rewriting it in full:
t2 −
R t
t
1−
√
1−λ2 tt
λ
¡
tq − λ2
¡
q2 + tt
¢¢
f (q) dq
1− F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t)
− λtt > 0 for t ∈
³
t, λt
2
2t−λt
´
. (12)
We first evaluate (12) at t = t, which is the lower end of the range, obtaining,
(1− λ)t2 − 1
P (t)
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f(q)dq > 0, (13)
since t > 0. Recall that r = 1−
√
1−λ2
λ , and let P (t) = 1 − F
¡
t
¢
+ F (t). Next
diﬀerentiate the LHS of (13) with respect to t:
2 (1− λ) t+ f (t)
P (t)2
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
1
P (t)
½
(1− λ) t2f (t)− r
µ
r − λ
2
¡
1 + r2
¢¶
t2f (rt) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
.
Note that r − λ2
¡
1 + r2
¢
= 0, and so the above is
2 (1− λ) t+ f (t)
P (t)2
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
1
P (t)
½
(1− λ) t2f (t) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
,
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which is 0 at t = 0. Had this been positive the proof would be complete. Instead,
we need to check the second derivative:
2 (1− λ) +
d f(t)
P (t)2
dt
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq+
2f (t)
P (t)2
½
(1− λ) t2f (t) +
Z t
tr
(q − λt) f (q) dq
¾
−
1
P (t)
½
2 (1− λ) tf (t) + (1− λ) t2f 0 (t) + t (1− λ) f (t)− r (tr − λt) f (tr)−
Z t
tr
λf (q) dq
¾
.
Evaluating the above at t = 0:
2 (1− λ) +
d f(t)
P (t)2
dt
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq − (1− λ) t
2f 0 (t)
P (t)
.
or
2 (1− λ) + f
0 (t)
P (t)
½
1
P (t)
Z t
tr
µ
tq − λ
2
¡
t2 + q2
¢¶
f (q) dq − (1− λ) t2
¾
.
The requirement that f be Lipschitz continuous at 0 implies that f 0 (0) is finite, and
therefore the above is 2 (1− λ) > 0 at t = 0. Hence, the LHS of (13) is convex, which
establishes the Lemma.
The Lemma implies that, at least for a small increase in the lower bound of the
interval of joiners, all the joiners strictly prefer to join the intermediary. The obser-
vation that this continues to be true for a suﬃciently small increase in c establishes
the main result.
This existence result holds regardless of the distribution,11 and is therefore
very general. However it clearly does not characterise fully the set of sandwich
equilibria: as intuition suggests, and the technique of the proof confirms, there
is a rich multiplicity of sandwich equilibria:12 specifically, the set of sandwich
11The requirement that f be Lipschitz continuous at 0 is a suﬃcient condition, which
is used to prove existence, but is not necessary: sandwich equilibria exist even when the
condition is violated.
12The defining feature of a sandwich equilibrium is that the “top” and the “bottom”
traders do not join the intermediary: this feature is in contrast to the “threshold” equilibria
identified by the literature, where the highest types join the intermediary. There might also
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equilibria has, generically, full dimensionality in the set of possible values of
t and t.13 Intuitively, sandwich equilibria exist if a number of incentive con-
straints are satisfied, and the proof of Proposition 3 shows that it is possible
to select
©
t, t
ª
such that all these constraints are slack at the
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich
equilibrium. This implies that the set of sandwich equilibria contains
©
t, t
ª
-
sandwich equilibria which have the property that there exists ε such that for
every {v, v} satisfying |t− v|+ ¯¯t− v¯¯ < ε there is also a {v, v}-sandwich equi-
librium. This can be interpreted as giving our equilibrium set a degree of
robustness to the introduction of small errors in the matching technology avail-
able to the intermediary. Suppose, for example, that matching through the
intermediary is perfectly assortative with probability (1− ε), and random with
probability ε, with ε > 0 and “small”. This would reduce slightly the benefit
of joining the intermediary, given in (1), (3) and (5), and therefore make a
deviation slightly less attractive for types in
¡
t, 1
¤
, and slightly more attractive
for types in [0, t). Conversely, it would make following the equilibrium strategy
slightly more (less) attractive for types below (above) the average of the types
in
£
t, t
¤
. Except at the boundary of the set of sandwich equilibria, a suﬃciently
small ε would not prevent a pair
©
t, t
ª
from being a sandwich equilibrium.
exist more complex equilibria, for example, sandwiches with three slices: the unit segment
is divided in five intervals, such that type in the first, third and fifth stay out and those in
the second and fourth interval join the intermediary: in this case the middle interval has a
“hole”, that is there are types in
£
t, t
¤
who do not join the intermediary. This is analogous
to Bloch and Ryder’s (2000) finding that there might be threshold equilibria where there
are “holes” in the distribution of joiners (Theorem 3.5, p 107). This can only happen if the
intermediary charges a proportional commission, not, as here, a flat fee. We also conjecture
that there exist asymmetric sandwich equilibria, where the intervals of joiners are diﬀerent
on the two sides of the market, though their measure is the same.
13In Section 4.5, we use computer simulations to provide a full characterisation of the set
of sandwich equilibria, for specific values of the two parameters and restricting attention to
the uniform distribution.
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The “robust” nature of sandwich equilibria and their intuitive appeal given
by their “coordination equilibrium” nature may suggest that they are some-
what easy to obtain. This, however, is definitely not the case: existence of
sandwich equilibria is subject to quite stringent conditions. These conditions
illustrate the crucial role played by the continuation value, which must be such
that higher types have a better outside option, and therefore also provide the
intuitive reason for the emergence of sandwich equilibria. The following propo-
sition establishes this formally.14
Proposition 4 If the continuation value is constant across types, then there
are no sandwich equilibria.
Proof. Let the discounted value of the common option be denoted by ` > 0, the
same for all traders. We prove the Proposition by contradiction. Suppose therefore
that there does exist a sandwich equilibrium. Let x be the supremum of types who
join the intermediary at this equilibrium. Then, for any y > x, the following two
inequalities must hold:
x2 − c ≥ xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) + `Pr (xv < `) , (14)
yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) + `Pr (yv < `) ≥ yx− c. (15)
The probabilities and expectations on the LHS of (14) and on the RHS of (15) are
taken relative to the distribution of types who do not join in equilibrium. The LHS
of both (14) and (15) is the equilibrium payoﬀ: (14) requires that type x, who joins
the intermediary and receives payoﬀ x2 − c, is better-oﬀ than at her outside option,
otherwise she would not join. If she does not join, trade takes place if 2yv − 2` ≥ 0,
splitting the gross surplus equally; otherwise she collects her outside option, `. The
RHS in (14) and (15) is the deviation payoﬀ: if the type who joins were to deviate,
she would be randomly matched with a non-joiner and would save the fee. Vice versa,
upon deviation, a type who should not join in equilibrium decided to join instead,
14Damiano and Li (2007 p 260) conjecture that type dependent reservation utilities would
not alter the “threshold” structure of the equilibria. Our paper can therefore be seen as
limiting the applicability of this conjecture.
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she would pay the fee and be assortatively matched with a trader on the other side,
whose type will be arbitrarily close to x, the supremum of the joiners. As y > x,
either trade occurs, giving y the payoﬀ in the inequality or it is y who refuses to
trade to obtain an even higher payoﬀ.
Rearranging the inequalities we have
x2 − xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `)− `Pr (xv < `) ≥ c (16)
≥ yx− yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) .
Next, note that
xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) + `Pr (xv < `) ≥ xE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) + `Pr (yv < `) .
This holds because the LHS is type x’s optimal deviation payoﬀ, while the RHS
assumes that (following a deviation) sometimes x trades even if it gives her less than
her outside option.
Hence a necessary condition for (16) to hold is that
x2 − xE [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) ≥ c
≥ yx− yE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)− `Pr (yv < `) ,
or
(x− y) (x−E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)) ≥ 0. (17)
Note that, by (16), x − E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) ≥ `Pr(xv<`)+cx > 0. Thus if we can
show that there exists y > x such thatE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)−E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `) <
`Pr(xv<`)+c
x , then x − E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) > 0 and hence (17) implies a contra-
diction. Such a y indeed exists because — by construction — all types between x and
y do not join the intermediary; since the type distribution contains no mass points,
E [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `) is continuous in y, soE [v|yv ≥ `] Pr (yv ≥ `)−E [v|xv ≥ `] Pr (xv ≥ `)
converges continuously to 0 as y tends to x.
The logic underlying this result is that a uniform outside option has no eﬀect
on the outcome of bargaining; the gross surplus is divided equally between
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the parties. This is exactly the same as when utility were non-transferable:
our paper therefore shows that for sandwich equilibria to exist it is necessary
that utility is non-transferable. Intuitively, the fifty-fifty arrangement implied
by uniform continuation value or non-transferable utility makes meeting high
types very attractive, and thus puts an upper bound on the relative probability
of meeting a high type if not joining the intermediary. On the other hand, this
very fifty-fifty split also makes meeting low types not very attractive, because
they will have a good deal of bargaining power. To keep high types from
joining the intermediary the relative probability of meeting a low type if not
joining the intermediary must be low. As it turns out, these two requirements
cannot be simultaneously met. To alter the constraints so as to make them
compatible with each other, the bargaining outcome needs to favour the higher
types. Having a continuation value which is increasing in the type does just
that.
4 Discussion
4.1. We have assumed perfect information: upon meeting, the traders can ob-
serve each other’s type. Asymmetric information would give rise to a potential
for signalling. The decision whether or not to join the intermediary conveys
some information, and thus it aﬀects a trader’s payoﬀ not just because it af-
fects the range of potential partners, but also because it aﬀects the partner’s
beliefs about one’s type. Analysis of a model which incorporates both asym-
metric information and the possibility of joining an intermediary is likely to be
beyond tractability. Interestingly, in a pure signalling set-up, Feltovich et al.
(2002) show that there can be equilibria with non-monotone signalling strate-
gies, also known in the literature as counter-signalling. In these equilibria, only
middle types send the costly signal, while low types and high types pool by
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not sending it.15 The analogy with the outcome of our model suggests that,
in situations where there is a binary choice (join the intermediary or send the
signal), non-monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies in type is a common
outcome (Renou, 2010, is another example).
4.2. Some of the existing literature (e.g. Yavas¸, 1994, Bloch and Ryder,
2000) considers a fee proportional to the benefit from trade, as is the case when
the intermediary charges a commission. This has a much higher information
requirement than a flat fee, and in fact many markets (online dating, mortgage
brokering and shopping centres for examples) do charge a flat fee. A second
reason why we have chosen to model the case of a flat fee is that we wanted
to explain the existence of sandwich equilibria, and a proportional commission
makes their existence easier : with a flat fee, when middle types join, it is
certainly the case that the high types will not forgo intermediation due to its
cost, as it may happen with a proportional commission. Finally, note that
the existence of non-degenerate sandwich equilibria is not due to the flat fee
excluding the lower quality segment from intermediation, since our result holds
for zero fee.
4.3. A further assumption we made is that the intermediary has access to
a perfect matching technology, whereas trading in the direct market gives rise
to perfectly random matching. In practice, of course, both are approximations.
Relaxing them has in general an ambiguous eﬀect on the attractiveness of using
the intermediary. On the one hand, real world trading in the direct market is
far from random: for example, high quality singles who do not join a lonely
15As an example, suppose there are three types, H > M > L, and the signal is binary.
Suppose that H types are much more likely to be associated with one signal while L types
with the other, while M types are associated with either with equal probability. In such a
situation, H is suﬃciently confident that she will be told apart from L and hence she is more
interested in distinguishing herself from M. AsM is signalling to distinguish himself from L,
the way for H to be diﬀerent is by not signalling.
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heart agency but choose to search by patronising nightclubs are much more
likely to meet a high quality potential partner, since the choice of nightclubs
or similar venues is clearly not random: dress codes, bouncers, high prices
for drinks are all imperfect substitutes for membership fees. This reduces the
opportunity cost of not joining, reducing further the non-joiners’ incentive to
join. Moreover, if the intermediary has access to a technology less perfect
than what we have assumed here, then again joining it clearly becomes less
attractive. A countervailing tendency is the fact that, while we have assumed
that matching occurs with probability 1 both through the intermediary and in
the direct market, in practice the frequency of matches would be lower in the
direct market.
We note however that a technological advantage by the intermediary is
essential for the existence of sandwich equilibria. Suppose matching through
the intermediary is in fact random. It can be shown that, if c is positive,
there is no sandwich equilibrium. When c = 0, there is a unique sandwich
equilibrium:16 this is given by the condition that the average type is the same
in the direct and the intermediated markets. Because of supermodularity, for a
strictly positive fee diﬀerent types would be indiﬀerent at diﬀerent diﬀerences
in averages, so only threshold equilibria can exist.
4.4. A natural question of interest is the shape and size of the set of
sandwich equilibria. This matters because, if it turned out in practice that any
sandwich equilibrium is arbitrarily close to a threshold equilibrium, which is a
degenerate {t, 1}-sandwich equilibrium, then our analysis would not be able to
explain the observed regularity which motivate it, that “a lot” of top people
do not use intermediation. While characterising in general the set of sandwich
equilibria is hard, a simple example suﬃces to address this question. In Figure
3,17 we illustrate the entire set of sandwich equilibria, in the special case of a
16Provided we maintain the assumption of assortative matching in the second period.
17The appendix (available on request or at sites.google.com/site/giannidefraja/) provides
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Figure 3: The sandwich equilibria for two values of λ and two values of c.
uniform density function for v and q, that is when f (t) ≡ 1. The two diagrams
depict the lower portion of [0, 1]2 (note that the diagonal is not a 45 degree line,
as the axes are drawn in diﬀerent scales). The highlighted regions are the sets
of sandwich equilibria for two values each of c and λ. In both diagrams, the
shaded (respectively outlined) area represents combinations of points
¡
t, t
¢
such
that a
©
t, t
ª
-sandwich equilibrium exists when c = 0 (respectively c = .0005).
For c = 0 and λ > 1/2, the set of sandwich equilibria is drawn on the right
hand side of Figure 3: the lower contour of the set is the set of points on the
horizontal axis between a critical value of t and 1; the upper contour of the
sandwich equilibrium set is a locus strictly above 0 for t < 1, which tends to 0
as t tends to 1. When c is positive, clearly there cannot be equilibria where the
lowest types join the intermediary as they cannot aﬀord the fee: but note the
“multiplier” eﬀect of the fee, it is not the case that types just below the lowest
type who join, are deterred from joining by the fee (which is tiny fraction of
details of how the pictures have been obtained. In essence, it was a “brute force” process:
given t and t we checked that no trader in [0, 1] had an incentive to deviate, and repeated the
procedure on a fine grid, checking for every possible pair of points
¡
t, t
¢
below the diagonal.
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their valuation); rather, if there are too few low types joining then the highest
types who should join the intermediary will prefer to deviate as they are likely
to be matched with types from the upper end of the distribution.
Threshold equilibria are points on the vertical segment joining (1, 0) and
(1, 1). By Proposition 2, all points on a vertical segment with its lower end at
(1, 0) are threshold equlibria, and, for c = 0, by Corollary 2 the set of threshold
equilibria is the entire segment joining (1, 0) and (1, 1). Note therefore that, for
c = 0, the equilibrium set (the union on the set of sandwich and of threshold
equilibria) is connected for high λ and disconnected for low λ. Numerical
simulations suggest that, for the uniform density case we considered the cut-oﬀ
value of λ is 1
2
. As Proposition 3 gives suﬃcient conditions, it is not surprising
that there exist sandwich equilibria for λ < 1/2 as well. Note that, as shown
in Figure 3, in the low λ case, t can be very low, and even for λ high there are
sandwich equilibria where no trader above the median uses the intermediary.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to our understanding of markets where intermediaries
are active but traders may also choose to trade unassisted.
Stylised facts indicate that trader behaviour may be non-monotone. For
example, consider education: the widespread evidence of assortative matching
in the marriage market (eg. Blossfeld and Timm, 2003) indicates that it is a
supermodular characteristic: more educated individuals value education more.
With this in mind, consider the diagram in Figure 4. It is an illustration
derived from the dataset constructed by Hitsch et al (2010). They study the
link between mate preference and match formation, and report data on the
education level of internet users at large and a representative sample of the
members of a major online dating service provider in San Diego and Boston.
In the picture, we choose convenient thresholds in their ranking to determine
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Figure 4: Probability that an internet user looks for a partner in the dating agency
three groups. The figure plots the percentage of internet users belonging to
each group who have joined the dating service. The diagram suggests a non-
monotonic relation between “type” and the propensity to join the intermediary:
those with intermediate education levels are considerably more likely to use the
online provider than types with higher or lower education.18
In this paper we have rigorously established that this non-monotone be-
haviour, where the traders who have the most to gain from using the superior
matching mechanism provided by the intermediary choose not to use it, may
indeed form part of an equilibrium. The existence of such “sandwich” equilib-
ria, however, is subject to the strong condition that the traders’ continuation
value is suﬃciently increasing in their type. Consequently the intertemporal
characteristics of each market determine whether or not sandwich equilibria can
18The diagram is only suggestive, as clearly only a small fraction of the internet users are
looking for a partner in the period considered. It seems plausible that the likelihood of being
looking for a partner is roughly independent of education. In this case, if we conditioned the
joining probabilities on actually being looking for a partner, the height of each bar would
increase roughly proportionally, and their relative size would not change.
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exist: high type traders have most to gain from trade now, this must continue
to be the case if they choose to delay trade.
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